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1

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
Ro1-rnwr

KI~GSLI~Y \VELLS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
T1lE DK\'Tl~R & RIO GRANDE
".n:~TEH:Y RAILROAD COMPANY,
J 1'<1qm1ntion,
Def end ant and Respondent.

I
(

Case No.
10605

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
ST'ATEMEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Thi::: is an action to rerover damages for personal
injuries m·ising out of a railroad crossing accident.

D lSPOSITION IN LOvVER C01JRT
The trial court granted defendant's motion for dil'f'dt•d wrdid at the conclusion of plaintiff's case and
"ubsequently entered judgment on the verdict dismissing
tlie action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff S<'l'lrn reversal of the judgment below and
an ordpr granting a new trial.
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STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
The defendant offered no evidence i·n "·
l
view of tie
trial court's rnling on the motion for directed verdict.
Accordingly, the only evidence before the court is that
presented during the course of plaintiff's case. The
Statement of Facts prepared by counsel for plaintiff i~
correct but incomplete. ~Vv e shall attempt to supplement
the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's Brief
m those particulars deemed material to the appeal.
At the crossing where the accident occurred ther1:
are eight tracks which cross Fourth North Street. The
collision occurred on the western-most track which is the
main line of the Denver & Rio Grande vV estern Railroad
Company. Thus, the automobile in which plaintiff ww
riding had crossed seven sets of tracks before the collision on the Rio Grande track. There is a distance of
approximately 25 feet between the seventh track and
the track where the collision occurred, which provided
ample space for the motorist to stop his vehicle and wait
for traffic on the Rio Grande track.
There was no obstruction to a motorist's vie1r of
the approaching train. The train had an engine headlight
burning, the engine bell was ringing and the crossing
whistle was sounded intermittently as the train
approached the crossing. Plaintiff's evidence also established that the driver of the automobile, Mr. Lawrence,
did not see the approaching locomotive and did not hear '
its bell or whistle. In fact, Mr. Lawrence was unaware
that there was a train on the track until after the impact.
An independent eye witness called by plaintiff estab-
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J that the train was in plain view; that the train 's
"rn;iJ'.\' hea<llight could he seen for a considerable distmH·P from tlw direction in which the train was approaching 1:nd that the signals sounded by the train were
l'hlrl;.· audible.
r,.]:1

Ln 11TencP was intimately familiar with the crossing
1, ]i!'i ,, tlw accident occurred. He had invariably gone
·1V1'i' th:s cro8s;ng as he went to and from work and in
add it ion drove his wife to and from her employment
,•ach day, five days a week. Thus, he had traversed
tlw c:·ossing an average of four to six times a day, five
cl::i:1 s a y·(·c·k for ten years prior to the accident (R. 79,
Dl). Since he had worked night shift for five years
:rnmt>diakly i)rior to the accident, he was familiar with
traffic to be• expected during the late evening hours
(R. 82). Both Lawrence and Wells had oftentimes waited
for Rio Grande trains on the main line track of the
Rio Grande while returning from their work at the close
of the night shift (R 98,112). Lawrence testified that
he ''knew there "\Yasn't any crossing watchman after
11 o 'dock at night"; that he wasn't "relying on any
crossing watchman being there on this particular occas; o·n" hecause he knew the watchman had left at 11
o'clock: that he "knew there wasn't any flashing warning
:-:; g-nals or gates" and further:

"Q.

A.

So as you entered and crossed those tracks,
you ]mew vou would have to rely on your
~wn faculties of sight and hearing¥
Yes, sir."

( See R. 92-93)
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The WPather \ms ch•ar and cold and visibility \%
good (R. 83, 9G, 105). 'rhe crossing \ms lightC'd \rith
at least three area lights at or nPar the point of tJi,,
accident (R. 95). During the Pntirt> course of the automobile's travPl over the crossing there was nothin~
which obstrnctt>d the driver's vi<'w in the direction nt
the approaching locomotive ( R. 72-7-1, 9-!, 101). Furtlwr,
there were no other trains on any of the other tra('b
to distract the attt>ntion of the motorist (R. 93).

As the automobile approached the crossing, Well>
had his eyes shut. Lawrence's account of the accidt'nt
was simply that he had stopped prior to crossing the
first track; that he had looked both ways and proceeded
west across the tracks at a speed of 10 miles per hour,
and that the ne:Xt thing he remembers is that he was
pla.ced in an ambulance (R. 84, 96, 98). The automobile
was new, in excellent condition and equipped with power
brakes. Lawrence testified "I could have stopped on ,
a dime" and "I believe I could have stopped instantly''
(R. 97). The windows on the automobile were rolled up
and clear. The radio was turned off and the two occupants were not conversing (R. 86, 97, 109, 110). The
evidence discloses that Lawrence drove his automo bile
a distance of approximately 150 feet from the point
where he crossed the first Union Pacific track to the ,
point of impact (Exhibit 1-P).
0

As the train approached from the north, its headlight '
illuminated the wa~- ahead for a distance of approximately one city block (R. 143, 1-17). The engine bell
was ringing (R. 143, 144) and the whistle was sounded
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in altPnrnte S('<jll<'TIC'(~ commencing at a point approximat(•lv one• hlock north of Fourth North Street the
.
'
final hlnst still heing sounded as the train entered the
crossing (R. 144, 150). The engineer's position in the
]rwo:uotivP made it impossible for him to see the
appronc-11ing whicle (R. 13G, 137). The fireman had a
Yiew to t]H> front and also in the direction of the approachim: nntomohilt' and he .velled for the engineer to "big
J11)li• it" 1Yhen the engine was "pretty near to the cross:Jtp:" \d1pn•npon the engineer engaged the emergency
lin:l:e, lmt it was too late to stop the train (R. 69, 70, 1361'.\7. 1-1-:2, 1-l-3). The impact occurred about 20 to 30 feet
onto the crossing (See Exhibit 1-P). The engineer testifiNl that the brakes made a good application and that
the train made a good stop. The train traveled a distance
of' :20-!- feet from the point of impact (R. 69).
An independent eye witness called by the plaintiff
saw the accident from a point approximately one-half
block north of the crossing (R. 153, 54). He testified:
"I distinctly remember the light [on the
train] ... I was right close to the train and I could
see kind of a glow from the light; the train was
quite a ways away at that time, but I knew it was
coming, and I was hurrying to get to work because
I was late; consequently, knowing the train was
coming, I ran for a while there so· I could get
across the tracks - wouldn't get blocked; quite
frequently large freights go through and delay
me even more." (R. 158).
This witness further testified that as the train
approached its headlight beam was so intense that he
turned his back to the train so that the light would
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not hurt his eyes (R. li55). Fpon turning his back to thr,
train this witrn~ss first obs<~rved the Lawrence automobile
entering the crossing (H. 155). \Vhen he first saw the
automobile, it had not yet crossed the eastern-most haek.
He did not see the automobile ~;top, although he testified
that it appeared to have slowed for the crossing (R. 161).
On the basis of plaintiff's evidence the defendant at
the close of plaintiff's case moved the court for a direded
verdict upon the grounds that there was no evidencr
of negligence on the part of the railroad company which
could have been a proximate cause of the accident and
that the negligence of the driver of the automobile wa~
the solE pro,ximate cause of the accident. The motion
was granted and this appeal followed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIRECTING A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF
ACTION"
That Lawrence ·was guilty of negligence which was
a proximate cause of the accident is certain and undisputed. Wilkinson vs. Short Line Railroad Company.
35 Utah 100, 99 P. 466; Nuttall vs. Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15; Benson vs. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P. 2d 790. Defendant contends
that the negligence of Lawrence was the sole proximate
cause of the accident and that the plaintiff offered no
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e,'idence from which a jury could reasonably find that the
defendant was guilty of negligence in any particular
which proximately contributed to the accident.
Plaintiff's theory of the case as set forth on pages
D and 10 of the Brief of Appellant is that the fireman
1·itlH·r l~nPw or should have known that Lawrence was
nrn1,rnre of the approaching engine at a time when the
fireman and engineer could still take evasive action
'" Jiich would prevent the collision. It is apparently plaintiff's contention that the fireman, having an opportunity
i!l se(' tlw approaching automobile, should have directed
till' engineer to make an emergency application of the
brakes at a time when the train was still far enough from
i.hP crossing to avoid the collision. This argument is
foundPd solely upon the factual circumstance that the
Lawrence automobile approached the Rio Grande track
for a distance of approximately 150 feet at a speed of
10 milrs per hour. From this evidence, counsel for plaintiff somPhow concludes that the engineer should have
known what 'Nas in the mind of Lawrence, to wit, to
proceed directly onto the Rio Grande track immediately
in the path of the approaching locomotive without stopping or slowing.
Actually there is no possible way the fireman could
have known or anticipated such action on the part of the
motonst and under the circumstances he certainly had
no duty to anticipate the gross neglect of Lawrence as
the auto slowly approached the Rio Grande track. There
was no other rail traffic to concern or distract Lawrence.
He had a 25-foot safety zone between the seventh U.P.
track and the Rio Grande track. This was the logical
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place for an apprnaching vehicle to stop in yielding the
right-of-'.vay to the train. At the speed he was traveling
Lawrence could have stopped almost instantly. The train
crew gave every conceivable warning of the approach
of the locomotive and there was no unusual circumstance
which in any way served as a warning that the motorist
was oblivious to the approach of the train. The engineer
testified that "lots of times" approaching automobiles
stop almost at the track (R 1-±9).

1

Counsel for plaintiff rely upon general principles 1
to the effect that a railroad company has a duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to prevent injury and
to act reasonably to utilize the means at hand to avoid
an a0Cident. These general rules are conceded to be
correct. They are neither controlling nor persuasive for ,
plaintiff's cause, however, when applied to the facts
of this case. There is not a single case or authority
cited in the Brief of Appellant which deals with facts and
circumstances similar to those before the court in this
case. The fallacy of plaintiffs theory in this case is
that it fails to take into account that there was no possible
means available to the fireman to avoid the accident at
the time when there first arose a duty on his part to
be aware of the peril of plaintiff. There is considerable
case law pertinent to this point.
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Gregory
vs. Denver and Rio Gr:ande Western Railroad Company,
8 Utah 2d 114, 329 P. 2d 407, determines the very issue
presented in this case. Coincidentally, the accident in
the Gregory case occurred at the very same crossing

!J

aml on the same track \Yhere the collision occurred in
tlH' case at bal'. The plaintiff in the Gregory case was
a passPnger in a vehicle approaching the crossing from
the same direction as the Lawrence vehicle and the train
y.·a:-; approaching from the north on the same track.
Th1::: case was tried before the late Ray VanCott, Jr.,
Judge, sitting with a jury and a motion for directed
\"(•1·dict was made at the conclusion of plaintiff's case.
The court granted defendant's motion, dismissed the
action and the cause was appealed to the Supreme Court
and affirmed. Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Gregory
ease upon the contention that the accident in that case
occurred during daylight hours and the train was traveling at a greater speed. Neither contention has merit
lwf'ause plaintiff's own evidence shows that the train in
the cm:e at bar was clearly visible to the approaching
motorist and that at the speed defendant's train was
traveling (20 miles per hour) it took in excess of 200
frpt to make a good stop.

In deeiding the Gregory case in favor of the railroad
company, this eourt held that there was no evidence
from which a jury could reasonably find tnat the railroad
company was negligent. In a separate concurring opinion
:21J r. Justice Crockett disposes of the very contention now
made hy counsel for plaintiff in the case at bar. (8 Utah
2d lH, 117).
"I concur in affirming the judgment but upon
a different ground: that viewing the evidence even
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the negligence of Mr. Gregory was the sole proximate
cause of the {3ollision. I don't see how reasonaihle
minds could find to the contrary. He approached
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this expanse of at lwst eight railroad tracks a.I
a very slow rate of speed, so that at any instant he
~oitld have stopped his car within a very feir
feet. There was no reason why he could not
have seen the train which wa·s coming from tlif
north. Under the old and well-established rulr
this impales him upon the horns of a dilemma: h~
either failed to look; or he looked and failed to
heed.
The tratin crew had the right to assume tha.f
Mr. Gregory would stop and would 1wt proceed
in front of the train, until the time something
occurred to warn them to the contrary. P{lrficularly in i iew of his very slow speed, this iroitld
not be until he got qitite close to their track, at
which time the train was practically upon him.
It is contrary to the generally known laws of
physics and common sense to expect the train,
with its greaot weight and momentum, to stop
within the short distance available after the instant it should have become apparent that Gregory
wa·s not going t.o stop. After tha.t point was
reached, there is nothing the crew could have
done to avoid the collision. And this is true
whether the train was travelling fast or slow and
whether the crew saw him or not." (Emphasis
added)
0

It is difficult to conceive of a precedent more closely
in point than the Gregory case.
The rationale of Mr. Justice Crockett in the Gregory
case is supported by other decisions of our Supreme
Court. One of these decisions is Van Wagoner, et al t!S.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 112 Utah 189·, 186 P. 2d
293. In Van lV aponer the engineer was on the side away
from the approaching motor vehicle and the brakeman

11
first saw tlte vehicle Yl'l1en it was approximately 160 feet
from tlw traek but did not realize that the vehicle was

not going to stop until it was approximately 25 feet
from the track. In holding for the railroad company
the majority opinion said: (112 Utah 189, 204)
"On the other hand, if appellants contend that
hy keeping a proper lookout, the crew could have
stopped the train, the evidence establishes other1\'ise. Failure to maintain a proper lookout was
not a jury question."

In a separate concurring opinion Justice Wolfe dealt with
rlw issnt> as follows:
"I think the evidence together with all legitimate inferences therefrom is all one way, that the
train, even with the best of lookouts, could not be
stopped after it became apparent to the crew that
the driver of the truck was not going to stop.
There simply was not time then for the train to
be stopped in order to avoid the collision....
Net> also Lmi'rc11a vs. Bamberger Railroad Compa;n;y, 3
Ftah 2d. 2-l-7, 282 P. 2d 335, where the court under similar
cirrmnstances affirmed defendant's motion for directed
Yerdict made at the close of plaintiff's case.
The Reporters are replete with railroad crossing cases
involving similar circumstances. These decisions fully
sup11ort the rationale and holding in the Gregory and
T'all TVagoncr cases supra. In Bordenave vs. Texas and
Nnc Orleans Railroad Cornpany, 46 So. 2d 525 (La. 1950)
plaintiff \\'as passenger in an automobile which proceeded
~ov<'r a series of six tracks and was struck on the seventh
·.\
track. In an opinion reversing judgment for ~eof,aQIJi)l

"O'tS\ ·

JUN l 9 \9€)/,
1>...

nObo,.~

.N l\OIM'-'

]~

tiff, thr' Louisiana Supreme Court said: (-!:(} So. 2d 5 ~ .
5
530)

. "It wo:1ld be thoro~ghl>' unrPasonahle to !'(~
qmre a tram crew to brmg the train to a stop t
avoid an accident which could onl>, he conten;~
plated as possible and no,t imminent."
Buchthal 1JS. New York Central Ra-ilroad Compaiiy,
334 Mich. 556, 55 NW 2d 92, is another suit by a passenger
in an automobile involved in a crossing accidPnt. ln
dealing with the plaintiff's contention that the railroad
company had failed to maintain a pro1x•r lookout, tJ 1p
Michigan Supreme Court said:

"Plaintiff contends that under the admittPr!
conditions of good visibility the train ere\\-, 11articularly the fireman and the engineer, charged
with the duty of observing persons lmdully cro~>
ing the tracks and of maintaining a reasonahle
lookout, should have stopped the train when the
car became visible. There ·was no duty upon th1
train crew to slow down the train or stop, even
if they had seen the car....
A case from the l\Iinnesota Supreme Court, Schrolil
vs. Vall, 245 J\Iinn. 114, 71 NW 2d 843, fortifies Mr.
Justice Crockett's opinion in Gregory under facts wry
similar to the case at bar. In that case the court ~aid:
(71 N ·w2d 843, 847)
"The issue as to whether the train was kept
under proper management and control was improperly submitted to the jury. Trainmen may
reasonablv assume that the vehicle approachmg
a crossing will stop before getting into a position
of danger. 'They are not required to asswne
otherwise until, in the exercise of reasonable care,
they should apprehend danger.' Thus, the fireman
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was under no duty to notify the engineer of the
truck's approach until it became apparent that
th(· driver ~was not going to stop and that a
collision was imminent. 'rhe fireman testified that
he expected the truck to stop, and there is no
n·ason why lw should have expected otherwise
until the contrary became apparent. The truck
was prneL•t>ding at a relatively slow speed o.f from
lfl to :20 miles per hour. It was not driven in a
manner indicative of an intention not to stop. The
nncontradicted testimony is that, when it became
apparent that the truck was not going to stop for
the crossing, the :fireman immediately commanded
the engin<:'er to stop. The engine was then only
:.'.~1 to :;(J fret from the crossing. The train was
t71e11 so closr that all efforts of the engineer would
110/;

hare m;oided the collision." (emphasis theirs)

In K ('er;1111 rs. Clz icago M.S. and P.P. Railway Compan1), :2;)1 \Yis. 7, 2.7 X\V 2d 739, the fireman observed
a truck approaching the crossing for a considerable distanc1, at a s1wed of 10 to 15 miles per hour but gave
no warning tu the engineer to make an emergency applieation of the hrnkt·s until the truck was 10 or 15 feet
from the track. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed upon rationale identical to the quoted portion of
the opinion in the Grr.r;ory case. In this case the court
reasoned as follows: (27 KW 2d 739, 742)

"X othing there said deprives the engine crew
of the right to assume that a traveler on a highway
\\·ill look and listen and not go onto the track
into danger when it is apparent that a train is
approaching·, and to continue this assumption
until the contrary becomes apparent or he does
something to indicate a contrary intention on his
part. (cases cited) The truck in which deceased
was riding was traveling at a slow rate of speed,
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wl~ich is evidenced by the fact that the driver

said he could have stopped it ·within ten feet.
There was nothing unusual in the manner in
which the truck approached the train, nor is there
any proof of facts \Vhich would cause a reasonable
person to believe the driver of the truck was not
aware of the approaching train."
Another

in voint 1s Let:c11dosky VS. ChicaDr),
Milwaukee, St. Pr111l and P. Railirny, 223 F. 2d 393
(8th Cir. 1955) "-here a cli'·Pch>d nl'dict in favor of the
railroad cornvany 1Yas aff rmed upon reasoning as follows : ( 223 F. 2d 395, 401)
C'?..SP

"'Travelers in motor vehicles frequently and
custonwril11 drive toward an oncoming train and
stop .iust before going upon the tracks in order
to permit the train to proceed on its way. There i.;
in such conditd, however, no 'peril' until s11cl1
wayfarer fails t.o stop in a zone of safety. Those
in charge of the train have a right to assume that
he will not drive into danger.'"

"'Under the record, after the perilous position of the automobile was in fact discovered by
the trainmen, the injury could not have been
avoided by the exercise of ordinary care on the
part of the men in charge of the train. The employees in charge of the train had the right to
assume that the automobile would not be driven
heedlesslv on the track ahead of the approaching
train. It· is a matter of common knowledge that
automobile drivers frequently drive right up to
the track before coming to a stop. Under the
record in this case, it is manifest that the employees of the defendant, after they ascertained
that the automobile was not going to stop for the
crossing, had no time to do more than they did
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in the preventing of the collision.' " (emphasis
added)
To the same effect is the reasoning of the Florida
SuprPme Court in a case involving similar circumstances
w]H•n• the court in 11! art in vs. Rivers, 72 So. 2d 789, (Fla.
]~):J-~) oh:,;r•1·ved: (72 So. '.2cl 789, 791)
"The fireman had the right, from the facts in
the record here, to believe that the deceased was
i11 possession of his faculties and his norrnal
senses, and that with all of the signals of danger,
the ('J"tent of which were almost overwhelming,
he u:ould not walk directly into the path of a
movi11g train. When the fireman finally realized
that the deceased was not going to stop and was
11ot going to heed every danger signal possible
to give, it was too late for any human agency to
extricate the deceased from the situation that he
plriced himself in or prevent the de,ath which so
1111 fortunately occurred.

"\Ve conclude that the undisputed facts in this
case entitled the railroad company to a directed
verdict. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed
with directions to enter one in favor of the railroad company." (Emphasis added)
Sec• abo Hynek vs. Kewmmee G. R. & W. Railway

Cumpu1u;, 5:.?l \Viscons;n 319, 29 NvY 2d 45; Gosnell vs.
Baltimore und Ohio Railroad Company, 189 l\id. 677,
57 A 2d ;j2~; JI issouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company
of Tex11s 1:s. Lane, 213 F. 2d 851 (5th Cir. 1954); and
:lfotthcw"' I's. NnD Orleans Tenninal Company, -15 So. 2d
5-t7, (La. 1930); Hymel vs. Texas and New Orleans Railruod Comwwy, l-t-5 So. 2d 138 (La. 1962); Illinois Central
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Bailrond Comprtii1J 1:s. Smith, 243 :Miss. 766, 140 So. 2d
85G; Rcrdy rs. illissouri, Kan.c:as, Texas Railroad Company, 34-7 S\V 2d 111, (::\Io. 1961); Brown vs. Louisville
and Nashville 1-lnilroad Compr111.71, 23-± F. 2d 204 (5th Cir.
193G); N rzr York Ce11tral Bail road Company vs. Monroe.
188 F. Snrp., 8:2Ci (S.D.N.Y. 19GO).

It is submitted that defendant's engineer had no
duty to antic;i;ate that Lawrence would fail to stop
and yield to the train. Further, under principles of law
long estahlished in this and other jurisdictions, the engineer under the circumstances of this case had a right
to assume that the slow-moving vehicle would stop and
yield to the train and the right to this assumption cnntinued up until the time that the automobile was virtualh
upon the track, at which time no possible evasive action
on the part of the train crew could have avoided the
accident.
Counsel for plaintiff has asserted some loose argument in the Appellant's Brief to the effect that plaintiff
may have been entitled to the benefit of the doctrine
of last clear chance, and that there is some evidence from
which a jury conld have reasonably found that additional
warnings should have been given by the train crew.
The first of these two contentions is entirely without
merit because plaintiff did not allege last clear chance
in his complaint; the pretrial order did not reserve the
issue· the contention was not made before the court
'
below by argument, evidence or request for instruction
and finally because the contention is squarely at odds
with the established case law. The plaintiff in the Van
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case suprn sought the benefit of the doctrine of
last elear chance but this court held that the doctrine
wa:o; inapplicable because the train crew had the right
to assume that the motorist would stop until it became
apparmt that it was not going to do so and that at the
time plaintiff's situation of peril became apparent there
''as tben no "clear opportunity'' for the train crew to
an1id tlw accident.
TT'a9ow~r

Also, there is no basis for the argument that the
train crew should have given additional warnings. Counsel for plaintiff embodies this contention in a single
paragraph on page 4 of the Brief of Appellant, concluding ·•obviously this is a jury question." The contention
is founded upon the testimony of the eye witness J aensch
that "the whistle stopped blowing somewhere between
his position and the crossing." (Page 14 Appellant's
Brief.) On cross examination J aensch testified that he
could not remember where the train was when the last
signal was sounded and that all he could say was that
the whistle ended when the train was somewhere between
him and the crossing (R.160, 161). Under this testimony,
the last signal could have been made when the train was
10 or 20 feet from the crossing. The engineer, on the
other hand, positively testified that the last signal was
still sounding as the train entered the crossing (R. 150).
In any event, the undisputed evidence is that both bell
and whistle were sounded and that the train was both
visible and audible to persons in the are.a for a considerable distance as it approached the crossing.
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